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“By the Court”: The Untold Story of a Canadian Judicial Innovation
Abstract

What do the BCE case of 2008, the Securities Reference case of 2010, the Senate Reform Reference case of
2014, and the Carter (assisted suicide) case of 2015 have in common? All are unanimous decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada in which the reasons for judgment—the explanation as to why the outcome is the
legally and constitutionally appropriate one—are not attributed to any specific named judge or judges on the
Supreme Court, but rather to a mysterious entity called THE COURT. Very few Supreme Court decisions
take this form, and there was a time not that long ago when no headline-worthy decision ever did—this is a
practice that emerged on an identifiable date with a trackable history. Moreover, it is a purely Canadian
story—it is not part of the legacy of English law, not something that crossed from south of the border by
imitative osmosis, not an idea copied from anybody else. It is something that was developed by Canadian
judges, that emerged in response to a very specific Canadian event, and that has evolved since that first
experience. This Commentary identifies and explores this underappreciated and understudied judicial
innovation.
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Commentaries

“By the Court”: The Untold Story of a
Canadian Judicial Innovation
PETER MCCORMICK*
What do the BCE case of 2008, the Securities Reference case of 2010, the Senate Reform
Reference case of 2014, and the Carter (assisted suicide) case of 2015 have in common? All are
unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in which the reasons for judgment—
the explanation as to why the outcome is the legally and constitutionally appropriate one—
are not attributed to any specific named judge or judges on the Supreme Court, but rather
to a mysterious entity called THE COURT. Very few Supreme Court decisions take this form,
and there was a time not that long ago when no headline-worthy decision ever did—this is
a practice that emerged on an identifiable date with a trackable history. Moreover, it is a
purely Canadian story—it is not part of the legacy of English law, not something that crossed
from south of the border by imitative osmosis, not an idea copied from anybody else. It is
something that was developed by Canadian judges, that emerged in response to a very
specific Canadian event, and that has evolved since that first experience. This Commentary
identifies and explores this underappreciated and understudied judicial innovation.
Qu’ont en commun l’affaire Bell Canada de 2008, le renvoi de 2011 relatif à la Loi sur les valeurs
mobilières, le renvoi de 2014 relatif à la réforme du Sénat et l’affaire Carter (suicide assisté) de
2015? Tous ces jugements de la Cour suprême du Canada ont été unanimes et les raisons
motivant leur verdict—l’explication précisant pourquoi le verdict était juridiquement et
constitutionnellement approprié – n’ont pas été attribuées à un ou des juges en particulier,
mais à une mystérieuse entité nommée LA COUR. Très peu de jugements de la Cour suprême
prennent cette forme et il fut une époque pas très lointaine où aucun jugement digne de faire
les manchettes ne la prenait—il s’agit là d’une pratique apparue à une date identifiable et
dont l’historique est retraçable. Il s’agit de plus d’une pratique purement canadienne, qui ne
nous vient ni du patrimoine juridique britannique, ni du sud de la frontière par un phénomène
d’osmose imitative, ni de nulle part ailleurs. Il s’agit d’une chose qu’ont élaborée des juges
canadiens en réaction à un événement très spécifique survenu au Canada et cette pratique a
évolué depuis son apparition. Ce commentaire révèle et explore cette innovation juridique à
la fois méconnue et rarement étudiée.

*

Peter McCormick is Professor Emeritus with the Department of Political Science at the
University of Lethbridge.
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WHAT DO THE BCE1 CASE OF 2008, the Securities Reference2 case of 2010, the Senate

Reform Reference3 of 2014 and the Carter4 case of 2015 have in common? All are
unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in which the reasons for
judgment—the explanation as to why the outcome is legally and constitutionally
appropriate—are not attributed to any specific named judge or judges on the
Supreme Court, but rather to a mysterious entity called “The Court.”
Not very many Supreme Court decisions take this form. Indeed, there was
a time not that long ago when no headline-worthy decision ever did—this is a
practice that emerged on an identifiable date with a trackable history. Moreover,
it is a purely Canadian story—it is not part of the legacy of English law; not

1.
2.
3.
4.

BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560.
Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, [2011] 3 SCR 837.
Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704.
Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331.
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something that crossed from south of the border by osmosis;5 not an idea copied
from anyone else. It is something that was developed by Canadian judges, that
emerged in response to a very specific Canadian event, and that has evolved
since that first experience. This commentary will identify and explore this
underappreciated and understudied judicial innovation.

I. WHO CARES? DEFENDING THE TOPIC
I begin by defending my choice of topic. It is striking that there is no literature
for me to review as an introduction to the topic—not a single journal article,
let alone a book, has ever focused on this phenomenon. Andre Bzdera set the
basic frame more than twenty years ago when he described the anonymous
unanimous judgment as a standard high court device for constitutional questions
on federalism issues, but the citations that accompany this bold claim bear on
the unanimous rather than the anonymous aspect.6 Although specific exemplar
cases are often discussed in the literature—given the profile of some of them,
how could they not be!—the anonymity of their authors is routinely ignored.7
At most, passing comments, often relegated to footnotes, note without expansion

5.

6.
7.

Some might doubt this claim of originality, thinking of the United States Supreme Court’s
per curiam practice as a possible model or inspiration. Such an attribution is mistaken,
because no USSC per curiam decisions are remotely like the major Canadian decisions—they
are either minor and concise to the point of boilerplate or constrained staccato summaries
of badly divided panels. The apparent similarity in the labels—“By the Court” being a
simple translation of the Latin “per curiam”—is completely misleading. For a description
of US practices, see e.g. Stephen Wasby et al, “The Supreme Court’s Use of the Per Curiam
Disposition” (1992-1993) 13 N Ill UL Rev 1; Stephen Wasby et al, “The per curiam opinion:
its nature and functions” (1992-1993) 76 Judicature 29; Michael Gizzi & Stephen Wasby,
“Per Curiam Revisited” (2012-2013) 96 Judicature 3. For that matter, the SCC also had
a long-standing per curiam practice, which was like neither the USSC’s per curiam nor the
SCC’s “By the Court” rulings, but instead followed the English style, consisting not of a set
of reasons for judgment but rather a section within the headnotes.
Andre Bzdera, “Comparative Analysis of Federal High Courts: A Political Theory of Judicial
Review” (1993) 26:1 Can J Pol Sci 3.
Consider, for example, the way the Supreme Court Law Review handled the 1979 language
decisions of Attorney General of Quebec v Blaikie and Forest v Manitoba (Attorney General), the
cases that are often (and, I will suggest below, incorrectly) accepted as the beginning of the
tradition. Although the content of the case was reviewed in two successive annual editions,
the author noted that they were unanimous but never once mentioned the fact that they were
delivered by and attributed to “The Court” rather than to a specific member of the panel. See
Attorney General of Quebec v Blaikie et al, [1979] 2 SCR 1016, 101 DLR (3d) 394 [Blaikie
1]; Forest v Manitoba (Attorney General), [1979] 2 SCR 1032, 101 DLR (3d) 385 [Forest].
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or commentary that the Court sometimes but infrequently uses anonymous
judgments in constitutional cases.8
Judicial biographies are little better. Three excellent biographies should be
of real assistance—those of Justices Bora Laskin,9 Brian Dickson,10 and Bertha
Wilson11—but they are not. The Laskin biography takes notice of only one of the
several “By the Court” decisions made on Laskin’s watch, confidently insisting
that although no author is indicated the turns of phrase are characteristic of
Laskin.12 It says nothing, however, about why anonymity was chosen in the first
place, who took the initiative, or how specific cases were chosen from the broader
caseload to take this form. One imagines the justices sitting around a table, one of
them suggesting this novel practice and others responding with either enthusiasm
or reluctance—but if any such meeting ever took place, the otherwise excellent
biography has nothing to say about it. Similarly, the Dickson biography declares
that although two specific decisions were reported as “By the Court” judgments,
Dickson’s own papers put it beyond doubt that Dickson himself wrote the
reasons in question.13 But again, there is no discussion of why the impersonal
label was used at all, no indication of why Dickson did not assume individual
responsibility in the usual way, no hint of a broader practice or policy.14 All three
biographies attach considerable importance to the unanimity of some of the
Supreme Court’s most important decisions; none take any real notice of the more
unusual feature of anonymity. “By the Court” seems to be all but invisible, except
when it is explained away.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.

See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2015) at 15-49,
n 249; or 18-20, n 114.
Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: The Osgoode Society/University
of Toronto Press, 2005).
Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: The Osgoode
Society/University of Toronto Press, 2003).
Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: The Osgoode Society/
University of Toronto Press 2001).
Girard, supra note 9 at 510.
Specifically, Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, 19 DLR (4th) 1 [Manitoba
Language Reference]; Tremblay v Daigle, [1989] 2 SCR 530, 62 DLR (4th) 634 [Tremblay].
See Sharpe, supra note 10 at 418 for Manitoba Language Reference; Ibid at 395 for
Tremblay v Daigle.
Ibid. In the process of discussing the decision, Sharpe and Roach illustrate one of the
problems with the “By the Court” style: when we write about judges, whether to praise or
to criticize, we do so in terms of the reasons they wrote. But “By the Court” prevents us
from doing this for some very important cases—we don’t know who to commend or blame,
whose evolving ideas to make those reasons part of—and Sharpe and Roach respond to this
deflection by fiercely reclaiming two of those judgments for the judge who is their subject.

McCormick, The Untold Story of a Canadian Judicial Innovation 1052

And yet, today—after a tumultuous half decade that has included the Securities
Reference,15 Reference re Supreme Court Act ss. 5 & 6,16 Senate Reform Reference,17
and Carter18—it is no longer possible not to notice the part that “By the Court”
played in ratcheting up the tension of the Court’s public contretemps with the
Harper government. “By the Court” is clearly unusual and unquestionably
important, and yet it remains under-explored to the point of utter neglect. This
omission calls for redress, which this Commentary will attempt to provide.
A. BROADER THEORETICAL ATTRACTIONS

“By the Court” judgments highlight two important theoretical issues in a
dramatic way. The first is what I will call the “presentation factor:” the way the
Court presents itself and its decisions (especially, but not only, the major ones)
are significant elements of what the Supreme Court is doing at any specific
point in its historical evolution. The content of a major judgment is of course
important, but the packaging is important as well; given that the words in a
judgment constitute the Court’s only way of exercising its influence, it would be
strange indeed to suggest that the mode of presentation simply does not matter,
that the Court just dashes off opinions without any thought about how to shape
and structure them to best effect. Thinking of the mode of presentation as the
product of conscious and shared choices is made more credible by the fact that
our Court’s self-presentation style has evolved through identifiable stages, and has
recently settled on a regular format that is globally unique in a number of ways.19
Marshall McLuhan famously said that the medium is the message; as a more
modest variant, the present suggestion is that the packaging matters. M. Todd
Henderson warns us never to treat any aspect of the way a national high court
delivers its reasons as something minor, to be shrugged off as an idiosyncratic
accident or whim.20 Rather, the way the Court presents itself must be understood
as the consciously shaped product of the institution’s reaction to the threats,
challenges, and opportunities of its immediate historical context, constrained by
the expectations of continuity that underpin its legitimacy. Although Henderson
was writing about the United States Supreme Court and specifically about the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Supra note 2.
2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Nadon].
Supra note 3.
Supra note 4.
See Peter McCormick, “Structures of Judgment: How the Modern Supreme Court of Canada
Organizes Its Reasons” (2009) 32 Dal LJ 35.
20. See M Todd Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent” (2007) Sup Ct Rev 283.
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frequency of minority reasons, his observation has broader applications. The
period of the modern style of “By the Court” judgments is the period of our
Supreme Court’s emergence as a major national institution, a constitutional
court in the fullest sense of the term and a significant player in the major political
controversies of the day. Recent decades have seen a considerable degree of
constitutional turmoil and change, arguably the most important consequence
of which has been the elevation of the Supreme Court of Canada to a national
profile. And many of the decisions that make this observation the most convincing
have been delivered “By the Court.”
The second issue is “the many and the one,” or, less cryptically, the panel court
paradox of the unavoidable tension between individualism and institutionalism.
On the one hand, the Court is comprised of nine fiercely independent
professionals, each with a unique sense of priorities and values and a strong desire
to see those priorities and values appropriately reflected in Canadian law during
their service on the Court; only rarely will these preferences coincide perfectly
with those of any of their colleagues, let alone all of them. On the other hand, the
Court is (especially today) a major national institution whose preferably unified
decisions are expected to deliver finality, certainty, and clarity, especially on the
larger issues. This dynamic calls for leadership (and therefore followership) and
compromise. The first wing of this paradox pulls the Supreme Court toward the
fragmented individualism of solo reasons, the second toward a preference for
solid majorities at least and for unanimity at best. The Court’s location on this
continuum is constantly being renegotiated, with different answers for different
time periods, for different Chief Justices, for different mixtures of personalities,
for different sorts of issues, and for different types of law. The old seriatim style,21
where every judge wrote free-standing reasons without reference to those of
anyone else, represents one extreme end of this continuum; the “By the Court”
style, with a single judgment that does not even acknowledge a lead author, is the
other extreme. This contrast is rendered all the more fascinating by the fact that
there was a clearly identifiable date when our own Supreme Court switched
abruptly and decisively (and therefore, presumably, deliberately) from the one to
the other for certain important purposes.
B. DEFINING THE TOPIC: WHAT IS “BY THE COURT”?

A “By the Court” judgment is a decision of the Supreme Court that is attributed
to the Court itself; no specific judge (or, on more recent practice, no specific pair
21. But not that old—it vanished from the Supreme Court judgment-delivery repertoire
only in the 1960s.
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of judges)22 is identified as the lead author or authors. This practice is unusual
because the tradition of common law appeal courts is for individual judges to
acknowledge their individual accountability by putting their name to the reasons
that they write.23 We know that, for the SCC, these reasons are actually negotiated
products of a collegial circulate-and-revise process, but this process qualifies
rather than obliterates the specific, focused responsibility of the lead author, and
we evaluate the performance of specific judges, for praise or blame, in terms
of these attributed reasons. “By the Court” flatly repudiates this expectation:
the whole point is that no single judge is identified and no individual accepts
responsibility. The Supreme Court does not adopt this accountability-cloaking
device very often, making it obvious that it is a deliberate choice and that it
is therefore important to understand when and why it takes this unusual step.
The first step toward an understanding of “By the Court” is recognizing the
extraordinary nature of this anonymity.
In addition to being anonymous, “By the Court” decisions are also
unanimous—although this should be treated as a matter of “usually” rather
than “always and by definition.” There are a small number of significant cases
where the decision has been presented as a joint judgment of all the judges in
the majority despite a divided panel; this minority is clearly part of the broader
phenomenon.24 These outliers are perhaps failed “By the Court” decisions, but
the attempt to achieve the same combination of anonymity and unanimity is
clear. Most of the Supreme Court’s decisions in recent decades are unanimous
but not anonymous; I am drawing attention to the smaller number that are both
unanimous and anonymous, but I still want to make room under the umbrella for
the even smaller handful that are anonymous without being unanimous. Nadon
is the most recent example;25 Reference re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution26 is
the most impressive, with not one but two different sets of anonymous majority
reasons for the two questions that the reference needed to address, both of which
22. See Peter McCormick, “Sharing the Spotlight: Co-Authored Reasons on the Modern
Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 34 Dal LJ 165.
23. See Michel Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Transparency and
Legitimacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Lasser highlights this practice as
anchoring an important difference between the civilian and the common law system, and
justifying a more discursive and policy-conscious style of judicial decision making.
24. It was an email exchange with Professor Jamie Cameron of Osgoode Hall Law School that
jolted me off the unanimity position and which led to an enormously fruitful recalibration of
the enquiry. I take this occasion to express my appreciation.
25. Supra note 16.
26. [1981] 1 SCR 753, 125 DLR (3d) 1 [Patriation Reference].
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are answered by a jointly-authored dissent. Reference re: Exported Natural Gas
Tax27 is an intriguing echo. Irwin Toy Ltd. v Quebec (Attorney General)28 is perhaps
the example that stretches the notion the furthest, as it was co-authored by the
three judges in the majority of a five judge panel. Purists might exclude these,
but if anonymity is the true core of the phenomenon, then the lack of unanimity
(often to the extent of a single solo dissent) is a distinction without a difference.

II. TOWARDS A HISTORY OF “BY THE COURT”
When was the first “By the Court” decision? Readers will expect me to say 1979,
but that would be wrong; the right answer is 1893,29 or perhaps even 1891.30
How many “By the Court” judgments have there been? Readers will expect me
to say something in the neighborhood of a couple of dozen, but that would be
wrong; the correct answer is just over 500.
These answers are strictly accurate, but they are at the same time somewhat
unfair because the hundreds of earlier “By the Court” judgments were short
decisions by small panels, often dealing with procedural or jurisdictional issues
through a consideration of applications and motions, and rarely involving
reasons that exceed two or three pages of text.31 These cases are significant in

27. [1982] 1 SCR 1004, 136 DLR (3d) 385 [Exported Natural Gas Reference]. See also Carter
v Canada (15 January 2016), Ottawa, SCC 35591 (Order Motion) [Carter Motion]. The
same highly unusual format of a joint judgment faced by joint dissent appears in the Court’s
recent decision in Carter Motion—the granting of the government’s request for an extension
of the suspended invalidity of the Criminal Code sections on assisted suicide—with a
joint judgment by five justices confronting a joint dissent by four. Since this was a fairly
brief decision on a motion, rather than a full decision on appeal, it is not included in
this discussion.
28. [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy].
29. See Baker v La Societe de Construction Metropolitaine, [1893] 22 SCR 364, 1893
CarswellNat 24.
30. See Moir v Corporation of the Village of Huntington, [1891] 19 SCR 363, 1891
CarswellNat 32.
31. For a detailed consideration of this earlier “minor tradition” see Marc Zanoni, An Early
History of the ‘By the Court’ Decisions on the Supreme Court of Canada (MA Thesis, University
of Lethbridge, 2016) [unpublished].
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terms of the institutional history of the Court,32 but they are thin gruel indeed
for expectations that have been shaped by cases like Carter or the Reference re
Secession of Quebec.33
So I will put aside what we might call the “minor tradition,” even though
it never came to an end and still accounts for the larger number of the “By the
Court” judgments even today. I will focus instead on the more recent “grand
tradition” that involves major—and almost always constitutional—decisions
of some profile and significance. Everything from this point will assume this
adjusted focus; when I say “By the Court” it will henceforth mean “in the
grand tradition.”
Even this story, however, does not start when most people assume it does,
which is to say with the Laskin Court’s 1979 decisions in the politically explosive
language cases of Blaikie 1 and Forest. The first true “By the Court” judgment in
the grand tradition came a dozen years earlier in the Reference re Offshore Mineral
Rights (British Columbia)34 in November 1967, and the second was the The Queen
v Board of Transport Commissioners35 case two weeks later. The dozen years of
silence separating these “By the Court” judgments from the pair of language
cases is worth noting, although it may mean little more than that constitutional
cases were thin on the ground and unanimous decisions in those cases even more
so. In any event, the Chief Justice presiding over the initial introduction of the
practice was not Laskin but John Cartwright.
All first times call for an explanation—dramatic new practices do not emerge
spontaneously out of the blue, especially in judicial institutions whose authority
is so deeply embedded in tradition and continuity. What induced the Supreme
Court to move the “By the Court” format from minor, usually procedural cases to
the centre stage of major constitutional decisions? The critical event seems to have
been one of the Supreme Court’s most embarrassing moments, namely the Steven

32. See James G Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court: History of the Institution
(Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1985). As Snell and Vaughan point out, questions of the
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional limits, and the development of shared understandings about
procedure, were important matters that needed to be sorted out, a process that took several
decades; collectively if not individually these cases are therefore a significant part of the
Court’s evolution.
33. [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385 [Quebec Secession Reference]; Carter, supra note 4.
34. [1967] SCR 792, 65 DLR (2d) 353 [Offshore Mineral Reference]. Delivered
7 November 1967.
35. [1968] SCR 118, 65 DLR (2d) 425 [Board of Transport Commissioners]. Delivered
20 November 1967.
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Truscott affair.36 The case was so unique, and the set of reasons it generated so
unusual, that it is less the first true “By the Court” than an important destabilizing
moment of transition—an unusual event provoking an extraordinary response,
but a response that was thereby established as a model available for wider (but not
general) subsequent application. That is to say: I suggest a strong form of path
dependence—absent Truscott, there would have been no grand tradition of “By
the Court.” The decisions in Offshore Mineral Reference and Board of Transport
Commissioners took that particular form because they could draw on the recent
example of Truscott;37 a dozen years later Blaikie 1 and Forest could do likewise
because the continuing members of the Court remembered the earlier trilogy.38
At the center of the initial choice was Cartwright; at the center of the sequel were
Justices Ronald Martland and Roland Ritchie.
Stephen Truscott was a fourteen-year-old student who was convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence of the rape and murder of classmate Lynne
Harper and sentenced to hang. An appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was
unanimously dismissed, and an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court was rejected by a five-judge panel, although the Diefenbaker government
commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment. But public unhappiness with
the trial and its aftermath persisted, and several years later the pressure on the
federal government was still such that they felt they had to do something. They
settled on posing a reference question to the Supreme Court, essentially asking:
Had you heard the appeal that you denied leave to eight years ago, would you
have allowed it?
There is no way that this question could not have been, at least, unwelcome
and, at most, highly offensive to the Court,39 because it was effectively asking
them to second-guess their own earlier decision.40 The discomfort was exacerbated
by the fact that four of the five judges from the earlier leave-to-appeal panel

36. Reference Re: Steven Murray Truscott [1967] SCR 309, 62 DLR (2d) 545 [Truscott].
Delivered 4 May 1967.
37. Offshore Mineral Reference, supra note 34; Board of Transport Commissioners, supra note 35.
38. Blaikie 1, supra note 7; Forest, supra note 7.
39. Although it was not unprecedented, as seen in R v Coffin, [1956] SCR 191, 114 CCC 1.
This case was a similar response to a federal government reference asking the Court how it
would have dealt with an appeal after it had denied the application for leave in that appeal.
A comparable third example is Reference re Milgaard, [1992] 1 SCR 866, 90 DLR (4th) 1.
40. Technically, not quite: The Criminal Code had been amended in the meantime, and the
reference asked what would have happened to the earlier application had those amendments
been in place. But given a decade of public controversy over the case, I doubt this was
enough to defuse the implicit challenge.
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were still on the Court, including the Chief Justice himself.41 The Truscott
case had drawn extraordinary public criticism that showed no signs of dying
down, the government was now passing the buck, and the Court’s own earlier
involvement had already made it part of the controversy such that it could not
distance itself from what might otherwise have been framed as a lower court
misstep. In the event, the Court chose to stand firm, and it did so by issuing
a truly extraordinary decision. After an appeal process that looked more like a
trial than an appeal—stretching over several days with expert testimony and
extensive cross-examination42—and in an appellate judgment that resembled a
trial judgment for its exceptional length and its detailed focus on specific pieces
of evidence, the Court insisted that the evidence pointed to Truscott as the only
possible culprit.43 On the nine-judge, full-court panel, only one judge—Justice
Emmett Hall—dissented; the enduring resentments that accompanied him for
the rest of his service on the Court show how strong the feelings were running
within the institution.44
The most obvious way for the Court to have spoken with clarity and
firmness, especially at a time when fragmented panels were the norm and
explicitly identified majority judgments were just emerging, would have been
an all-but-one majority judgment made more emphatic by being delivered by
the Chief Justice. This possibility was presumably undercut by the Chief Justice’s
involvement in the earlier leave-to-appeal panel, which would have enhanced
the “I still agree with myself ” overtones that many thought had rendered the
use of the reference process problematic from the beginning. The Court opted
instead for a united front “joint opinion”45 by eight judges listed by name. It had
never done such a thing before, but any first-ever practice is necessarily available
for subsequent emulation in different circumstances, and this is what happened
41. I was not able to find the composition of the 1959 leave-to-appeal panel in any of the books
or articles on the Truscott affair; the Registrar of the Supreme Court was kind enough to
send me a copy of the record of the panel’s decision.
42. To quote from the headnotes in the Supreme Court Reports: “At this hearing, the Court
received a large body of evidence, much of it relating to the medical aspects of the case and
also heard the oral evidence of the accused who had not given evidence at the trial.” Truscott,
supra note 36 at 309.
43. Truscott, supra note 36 at 366-367.
44. Regarding these enduring resentments, see Frederick Vaughan, Aggressive in Pursuit: The Life
of Justice Emmett Hall (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Frederick Vaughan,
“Emmett M Hall: A Profile of the Judicial Temperament” (1977) 15:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 306.
45. It seems worth noting that the Supreme Court has only used the “joint opinion”
self-description for a decision on three occasions, those three being Truscott, the Offshore
Mineral Reference, and Board of Transport Commissioners.
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six months later in the two constitutional decisions in November 1967. Since
these two later decisions were unanimous they took the form of “joint opinion[s]
of the Court.”46
The Laskin Court’s language decisions of 1979 therefore represent not
innovation but revival—and given that two members of the panels for those
1979 cases (Justices Martland and Ritchie) had served on all three of the 1967
panels, it seems plausible to present their own experiences and memories as the
basis for a conscious and deliberate revival. Laskin has a well-deserved reputation
as the great watershed Chief Justice, having presided over the transition from the
“old” Supreme Court that gutted the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights to the “new”
Supreme Court celebrated today, but the credit for the innovation of the “By the
Court” judgment belongs not to Laskin but to Cartwright.47

III. CREATING THE INVENTORY OF “BY THE COURT”
I have defined the phenomenon, described its emergence and early history, and
narrowed the focus to the “grand tradition” of major cases, which I will somewhat
generously define as reserved judgments with reasons running over 4000 words.48
There have been fifty of these in the forty-eight years since 1967, a number
that shrinks to forty-five if we treat companion cases (of which there have been
three pairs and one triplet) as single examples. I have described the two early
examples from the Cartwright Court in 1967; I will now provide an overview
of the “grand tradition” “By the Court” judgments for each of the subsequent
Chief Justiceships.

46. Truscott and Offshore Minerals were both federal reference questions, so joint opinion is the
precisely correct term; but Board of Transport Commissioners was a straightforward appeal
from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, and therefore presumably should have been
labeled a “joint judgment.” More recent usage has been more rigorous and consistent on the
distinction between judgment and opinion.
47. Technically to Taschereau, who was still Chief Justice for Truscott (but not for Offshore
Minerals and Board of Transport Commissioners), but as Vaughan’s biography of Hall explains
as delicately as possible, Taschereau was failing by the time of the Truscott hearings, and
Cartwright—his presumptive successor—was clearly in charge. See Aggressive in Pursuit, supra
note 44 at 210-14.
48. But I will stretch the point to include the much shorter decision in Forest, on the
grounds that Blaikie 1 and Forest are companion cases that should in some sense be
treated as a package.
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A. THE LASKIN COURT

The Laskin Court handed down nine major “By the Court” judgments over a
period of five years (stretching over six calendar years). The focus is striking: six
of the nine cases are reference cases posed by governments (federal or provincial),
and the other three are direct constitutional challenges to the actions of provincial
governments. The loose generalization that one can often find in the literature is
that “By the Court” judgments are all about constitutional law, and the string of
decisions by the Laskin Court completely vindicates this notion. For the Laskin
TABLE 1: “BY THE COURT” JUDGMENTS OF THE LASKIN COURT, 1973-1984
Case

Year

Words

Subject

1979

4,032

Federalism/Language

Forest*

1979

1,816

Federalism/Language

Reference re Legislative Authority of Parliament of
Canada51

1980

7,245

Federalism

Quebec (Attorney General) v Blaikie52

1981

6,424

Federalism/Language

1981

28,743

Federalism

Exported Natural Gas Reference

1982

12,811

Federalism

Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend
the Constitution55

1982

7,768

Federalism

McEvoy v New Brunswick (Attorney General)56

1983

5,569

Federalism

57

1984

12,758

Federalism

49

Blaikie 1*
50

53

Patriation Reference

54

Reference re Newfoundland Continental Shelf
58

Note: * = companion cases

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Supra note 7.
Supra note 7.
[1980] 1 SCR 54, 102 DLR (3d) 1 [Re Upper House].
[1981] 1 SCR 312, 123 DLR (3d) 15 [Blaikie 2].
Supra note 26.
Supra note 27.
[1982] 2 SCR 793, 140 DLR (3d) 385 [Quebec Veto Reference].
[1983] 1 SCR 704, 148 DLR (3d) 25 [McEvoy].
[1984] 1 SCR 86, 5 DLR (4th) 385.
I note that Blaikie 1 and Forest are not pure companion cases because they were not argued
before the Court on the same day, nor were they considered by the same panel of judges,
although judgment was delivered on the same day and they are directly sequential in the
Supreme Court Reports; I think under the circumstances it is more useful than misleading to
consider them as companion cases.
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Court, we can make the generalization even more specific: “By the Court”
judgments are all about federalism, and mostly concern reference cases.
But if we say the Laskin Court, are we necessarily saying Laskin? To put it in
other words: What is really happening behind the veil of “By the Court?” One
possibility is that the judgment really is a collective process to an extent far beyond
the circulate-and-revise process that the Court usually follows.59 In another
article, I have used function word analysis60 to explore the question of who was
the initial drafter of the “By the Court” judgments. That article undermines the
“strong committee” theory of “By the Court” rulings by demonstrating that the
methodology points usually to a single judge and only sometimes to a possible
pair of judges as the most likely writers; only for a single case is there enough
evidence to suggest a team process.61
The second possibility is that “By the Court” is a nom de plume for a judgment
actually written by the Chief Justice, a sort of judicial equivalent of the “royal we”
or “majestic plural.” In general terms, this theory is not borne out by the function
word analysis mentioned above. Chief Justices do the initial drafting for some,
but by no means all or even most of the “By the Court” decisions. The “first
among equals” leadership of the modern Chief Justice is a phenomenon that is
not completely understood, but it would be a serious overstatement to reduce
“By the Court” to such a narrow framing.

59. My research has turned up only a single “By the Board” decision of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in this new century, and that was explained in the opening sentence
in terms of every member of the panel having participated to such an extent that it would
have been misleading to attribute it to a single individual; the case was Cukurova Finance
International Ltd. v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd, [2013] UKPC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 875. We have
had no comparable explanation, within the reasons for judgment or otherwise, of the SCC’s
use of the format.
60. Function word analysis calculates each judge’s relative usage patterns for fifty-some of the
most common words, and then identifies the most likely author by generating similarity
scores with the corresponding usage patterns in the analysis sections of each of the “By the
Court” judgments. The language problem—some judges initially write in English, some
in French, and some are “switch-hitters”—is less of a problem than might be anticipated
because the Supreme Court Reports tell us that almost all of the “By the Court” judgments
were initially written in English. See Peter McCormick, “Nom de Plume: Who Writes the
Supreme Court’s ‘By the Court’ Judgments?” 39:1 Dal LJ [forthcoming in 2016].
61. See Peter McCormick, “Sharing the Spotlight: Co-Authored Reasons on the Modern
Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 34 Dal LJ 165. Even assuming that the tie in
function-word similarity scores indicates a two-judge collaboration of this sort (which is
itself a bit of a stretch), this would not of itself explain the “By the Court” format because
two-judge co-authorships are a fairly common practice on the modern Supreme Court.
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This therefore leaves us with the third possibility: Behind the façade of “By
the Court,” it is largely business as usual at the Supreme Court, which is to say
that the assignment of the responsibility of drafting the initial reasons is handled
on the basis of a rotation between a number of judges, tilted strongly toward the
more senior members of the Court.62 But this, of course, just knocks out two easy
explanations of what “By the Court” is all about and leaves the question of “why
these cases” as mysterious as ever.
In the immediate context of the Laskin Court and the specific role of Laskin,
there is some reason to doubt that Laskin himself played a strong part in the
re-emergence of “By the Court” in and after 1979. When the device was redeployed
in the fall of 1979, Laskin was absent for almost the entire term: He had been
hospitalized in Vancouver and returned to Ottawa (but not to full service on the
Court) just before the decisions were handed down.63 He is therefore more likely
to have been passenger than leader on those important re-introductory examples.
It is also striking that the use of “By the Court” dates not from the early stages
of Laskin’s Chief Justiceship but rather from the mid-point, and in particular
from the half-term when he was away from the Court. This does not make it
impossible for Laskin to have played some role in the innovation, but it makes
it less likely.
B. THE DICKSON COURT

For the Dickson Court, “By the Court” judgments are more numerous, though
their use is considerably more diffuse. Only two involved federalism issues, and
one of these was the extended follow-up to Forest in the same way that Blaikie 2
expanded and fulfilled Blaikie 1. Three others grew out of the Supreme Court’s
new challenge of an entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There was a pair
of cases involving First Nations issues, but these decisions do not loom large
in the Court’s development of First Nations jurisprudence.64 And there was a
curious pair of relatively short decisions—Air Canada v Dorval (City)65 and R v

62. For a description of “business as usual” in the allocation of the writing of judgments,
employing two different methodologies, see Peter McCormick, “Who Writes?: Gender and
Judgment Assignment on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 595;
Peter McCormick, “Judgment and Opportunity: Assignment of Reasons on the McLachlin
Court” (2015) 38 Dal LJ 271.
63. Girard, supra note 9 at 447-449.
64. Quebec (AG) v Healy [1987] 1 SCR 158, 3 ACWS (3d) 383 [Healy]; Canadian Pacific Ltd v
Paul [1988] 2 SCR 654, 53 DLR (4th) 487 [Canadian Pacific].
65. [1985] 1 SCR 861, 19 DLR (4th) 401 [Dorval].
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Wigman66—which are notable for the fact that neither raises any constitutional
issue at all. Their inclusion in the grand tradition is therefore mildly suspect. These
two cases aside, the generalization that “By the Court” is about constitutional
law is sustained, although the scope of constitutional concerns addressed is
considerably broader. Only one of the cases (Manitoba Language Reference67) is
a reference question; all the others apparently involved a discretionary proactive
choice by the panel to treat this particular case anonymously, although the reasons
for this choice are never made explicit.
TABLE 2: “BY THE COURT” JUDGMENTS OF THE DICKSON COURT 1984-1990
Year

Words

Subject

Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v
Quebec (Attorney General)68

Case

1984

8,418

Language/Charter

Dorval69

1985

4,217

Municipal law

Manitoba Language Reference

1985

18,068

Federalism/Language

Healy71

1987

6,972

First Nations

1987

4,783

Criminal law

1988

8,529

First Nations

1988

9,190

Federalism

1988

24,634

Language/Charter

70

Wigman72
73

Canadian Pacific

74

Clark v Canadian National Railway
75

Ford v Quebec (Attorney General)*

76

1988

9,277

Language/Charter

77

Irwin Toy

1989

22,707

Charter

Tremblay78

1989

13,593

Charter

Devine v Quebec (Attorney General)*

Note: * = companion cases

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

[1987] 1 SCR 246, 38 DLR (4th) 530 [Wigman].
Supra note 13.
[1984] 2 SCR 66, 10 DLR (4th) 321.
Supra note 65.
Supra note 13.
Supra note 64.
Supra note 66.
Supra note 64.
[1988] 2 SCR 680, 54 DLR (4th) 679 [Clark].
[1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR (4th) 577 [Ford].
[1988] 2 SCR 790, 55 DLR (4th) 641 [Devine].
Supra note 28.
Supra note 13.
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Eleven examples in six years certainly suggest a vigorous and deliberate
“By the Court” strategy on the part of Chief Justice Dickson, but the impression
needs to be adjusted in light of the fact that some of the examples are clearly
less a matter of strategic choice than of administrative convenience, a way of
dealing with problem cases where a judgment simply could not be attributed in
the normal way. The Dickson Court had significant and recurring problems with
the chronic poor health of several of the judges, aggravating the double challenge
of a high case load and the pressure of dealing with the precedentially critical first
generation of Charter decisions.79 This resulted in several “By the Court” decisions
that we might think of as accidental, and the purest example is Healy. After a
standard “By the Court” beginning—“judgment delivered by The Court”—the
actual text begins “We adopt the reasons for judgment written and circulated by
our late and much respected Justice Chouinard during the Fall Term. The reasons
follow.”80 That is to say: The “By the Court” format notwithstanding, there is an
attributed solo author, but under such circumstances that it could not be handled
in the usual fashion.
The major language decisions of Ford and Devine are examples of somewhat
similar circumstances.81 At his request, Justice Le Dain had been assigned the
drafting of the reasons for judgment and had circulated a version during the
summer of 1988, only to be incapacitated and hospitalized in the fall—so
much so that the work of revising the initial draft fell to Justices Lamer and
Wilson. Le Dain’s condition was serious enough that he could not sign his name
to the final versions, either as attributed author or even as a participating and
judgment-supporting panel member, and this misfortune is why the Supreme
Court Reports indicate (in a way that is technically correct but still profoundly
misleading) that he “took no part in the judgment.”82 The absence of a Healy-style
first sentence is presumably explained by the difficulty in finding an explanation
that would adequately cover the ground without embarrassing anyone. Canadian
Pacific (handed down the same day as Ford and Devine) may be another example,
with a seven-judge panel reduced by three retirements, pushing the Court very

79. Sharpe, supra note 10.
80. Healy, supra note 64 at 160-61.
81. Sharpe, supra note 10 at 427-432. There is no suggestion that these decisions would have
taken the “By the Court” appearance had Le Dain been able to follow through with the
revisions himself.
82. Ford, supra note 59 at 712; Devine, supra note 75 at 790.
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close to needing a rehearing of the case.83 Function word analysis indicates that
the most likely author is Estey, but he also had to be listed as not taking any part
in the judgment because more than six months had elapsed since his retirement.
Even without these problematic cases, the reduced count of seven “By the
Court” decisions in six years is still worthy of note, but it is curious—and further
undermines any impression of a considered consolidation of the practice—that
a further pair (Dorval in 1985 and Wigman in 1987) raise no constitutional
issues whatever.84
C. THE LAMER COURT

The Lamer Court delivered half a dozen substantial “By the Court” judgments;
one was yet another instalment of the Manitoba language litigation in Reference
re Language Rights Under s 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 & s 133 of Constitution
Act, 1867.85 A second was Sinclair v Quebec (Attorney General),86 a relatively
short and minor case on a municipal vote in Quebec. The other four, however,
address the major constitutional issues of recent decades: two significant Charter
cases—Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Tobias87 on judicial
independence, Libman v Quebec88 on limiting election expenses—along with
arguably the most important case to date on federalism (Quebec Secession
Reference89), and one of the most important (certainly the most explosive and
controversial) of recent cases dealing with First Nations Issues, Marshall v
Canada.90 On the one hand, the number of these cases had declined to the point
where there was a five-year period without a single example, the longest such gap
since 1979; on the other hand, the focus of the subject matter is wider and the
importance of some of the cases is unquestionable.

83. Under Supreme Court rules, five judges is the minimum for hearing an appeal, but four
judges still able to participate in the judgment is the minimum for delivering a decision, and
this only when the parties have consented to it. Judges can still participate in delivering a
judgment for a case where they heard the oral arguments, but only for a period of six months
after retirement.
84. Dorval, supra note 65; Wigman, supra note 66.
85. [1992] 1 SCR 212, 88 DLR (4th) 385 [Language Rights Reference].
86. [1992] 1 SCR 579, 89 DLR (4th) 500.
87. [1997] 3 SCR 391, 151 DLR (4th) 119 [Tobias].
88. [1997] 3 SCR 569, 151 DLR (4th) 385.
89. Supra note 33.
90. [1999] 3 SCR 456, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [Marshall 1].
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TABLE 3: “BY THE COURT” JUDGMENTS OF THE LAMER COURT 1990-1999
Case

Year

Words

Subject

1992

5,985

Federalism/Language

1992

4,046

Federalism/Language

1997

13,765

Charter

1997

15,477

Charter

Quebec Secession Reference

1998

21,587

Federalism

R v Marshall 96

1999

9,108

First Nations

91

Language Rights Reference

92

Sinclair v Quebec (Attorney General)
93

Tobias

94

Libman v Quebec

95

Note: * = companion cases

D. THE MCLACHLIN COURT

The “By the Court” list for the McLachlin Court is by far the longest and most
impressive of all the Chief Justiceships. This is not just a reflection of the fact
that (as of September 2014) McLachlin became the longest-serving Chief Justice
in the history of the institution; the per-year count is slightly below that for the
Dickson Court (though well above it if we exclude the accidental “By the Court”
rulings). More to the point, a high proportion of the cases on the McLachlin list
are robust cases of considerable weight, well above the 9,000 words that is the
average length of the reasons for judgment in a reserved decision. This suggests
that the use of “By the Court” is becoming not just more frequent but also more
targeted and deliberate.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Supra note 85.
Supra note 86.
Supra note 87.
Supra note 88.
Supra note 33.
[1999] 3 SCR 533, 179 DLR (4th) 193 [Marshall 2].
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TABLE 4: “BY THE COURT” JUDGMENTS OF THE MCLACHLIN COURT, 2000-2015
Case

Year

Words

Subject

2000

13,655

Federalism

R v Latimer

2001

10,672

Charter

United States v Burns99

2001

20,051

Charter

Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)100

2002

18,008

Charter

R v Powley*101

2003

6,422

First Nations

2003

5,460

First Nations

2003

11,497

Supreme Court

2004

7,140

Federalism/Charter

2005

10,669

Language/Charter

2005

4,034

Language/Charter

Okwuobi v Lester B Pearson School Board*

2005

9,355

Language/Charter

Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship &
Immigration)108

2005

19,749

Charter

Provincial Court Judges’ Assn of New Brunswick v
New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)109

2005

19,523

Judicial independence

Canada (Justice) v Khadr110

2008

4,448

Charter

2008

15,709

Commercial law

2010

5,446

Charter

97

Reference re Firearms Act (Canada)
98

102

R v Blais*

Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada103
104

Reference re Same-Sex Marriage

105

Solski v Quebec (Attorney General)*

106

Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General)*

107

BCE111
112

Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

2000 SCC 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 [Firearms Reference].
2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 SCR 3 [Latimer].
2001 SCC 7, [2001] SCR 283 [Burns].
2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3.
2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 SCR 207 [Powley].
2003 SCC 44, [2003] 2 SCR 236 [Blais].
2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259 [Wewaykum].
2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Same-Sex Reference].
2005 SCC 14, [2005] 1 SCR 201 [Solski].
2005 SCC 15, [2005] 1 SCR 238 [Gosselin].
2005 SCC 16, [2005] 1 SCR 257 [Okwuobi].
2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100.
2005 SCC 44, [2005] 2 SCR 286 [Provincial Judges].
2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125.
Supra note 1.
2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44.
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TABLE 4: “BY THE COURT” JUDGMENTS OF THE MCLACHLIN COURT, 2000-2015
Case

Year

Words

Subject

2011

9,576

Charter

2011

14,042

Federalism

Nadon

2014

18,513

Federalism

Senate Reform Reference

2014

12,575

Federalism

Carter116

2015

16,309

Charter

2015

3,778

Charter

R v Ahmad113
114

Securities Reference
115

117

R v Smith

Note: * = companion cases

Two cases in particular prove the point about this targeting. The first is
Provincial Judges, which is directed to clarifying certain aspects of the process
for determining judicial salaries that remained problematic after the blockbuster
judicial independence decision in 1997.118 The point here is not simply that
this decision is “By the Court” or that it is one of the longest and therefore
presumably most comprehensive of the McLachlin Court’s “By the Court”
judgments—although these features are significant. More importantly, Provincial
Judges is one of the few “By the Court” judgment in a remarkably extended string
of Supreme Court decisions touching on the matter of judicial independence,
those earlier decisions having been delivered by a surprising diversity of judges.119
It has something of the feeling of a very deliberate period at the end of a very
long sentence, and therefore a marked and very significant use of “By the Court.”

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

2011 SCC 6, [2011] 1 SCR 110 [Ahmad].
Supra note 2.
Supra note 16.
Supra note 4.
2015 SCC 34, [2015] 2 SCR 602 [Smith].
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of Provincial Court of PEI, [1997] 3 SCR 3, 150 DLR
(4th) 577 [Remuneration Reference].
119. For an extended discussion of that string of cases see Peter McCormick, “New Questions
about an Old Concept: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Judicial Independence
Jurisprudence” (2004) 37:4 Can J Pol Sci 839.
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The second is in some ways the most curious—the decision in BCE,120
which has been welcomed121 (and also criticized)122 as an important landmark
decision in company law, dealing with the obligations of corporate boards. This
is only the third “By the Court” judgment in the grand tradition not to raise
any constitutional issues whatsoever, the other two being the Dickson Court’s
decisions in Dorval and Wigman.123 With the obvious caveat that it takes more
than one swallow to signal a summer, these examples may be a first step towards the
conscious use of “By the Court” judgments for decisions that are both intended
as major and landmark contributions to unsettled corners of the law, and possess
a somewhat wider sweep than the constitutional issues that have provided the
focus of the practice to date. However, this is not to deny for a second that the
center of gravity of the device remains in the area of constitutional law, and the
McLachlin Court has clearly boxed the compass in this regard with decisions
dealing with federalism issues, Charter questions, and First Nations matters.

IV. FROM LIST TO STORY
When I started on this project, I was confident that I knew the general outlines
of the history of “By the Court.” That story would have started with Laskin,
who (I then thought) was directly involved in the emergence of the innovation,
but whose use of “By the Court” was as tentative and occasional as the term
“emergent innovation” implies, the more so because it began only rather late
in the Chief Justiceship when his health was already failing. The story would
have continued with a more frequent and enthusiastic use of the device under
Dickson’s leadership, with almost a dozen solid examples that included some
of the most urgent and controversial issues of the day as the language question
continued to heat up and Charter jurisprudence began to take shape. I would have
described this as the coming of age of the practice, constrained first by the short
period during which Dickson served as Chief Justice and second by a paucity of
the federal reference cases that had already seemed to be earning pride of place
for the practice. Lamer, however, delivered a mixed message. On the one hand,
with half as many “By the Court” decisions as Dickson in a Chief Justiceship that
120. Supra note 1.
121. See Jeffrey Bone, “The Supreme Court Revisiting Corporate Accountability: BCE Inc.
in search of a legal construct known as the ‘Good Corporate Citizen,’” online: Alta L Rev
Online Supplement 6 <http://www.albertalawreview.com/index.php/alr/supplement/view/>.
122. See e.g., Edward Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE and the Good Corporate ‘Citizen’”
(2009) 47:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 439.
123. Dorval, supra note 65; Wigman, supra note 66.
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was twice as long, Lamer’s tenure seemed to point to a gradual decline, a possible
ending of the glory days. It is particularly striking that Reference re Quebec Sales
Tax124 in 1994 is the only unanimous decision on a federal reference question
in the last fifty years that was not “By the Court.” On the other hand, Quebec
Secession Reference is arguably the quintessential “By the Court” judgment, the
poster-child that would lead any focused discussion of the practice.125 Finally,
McLachlin seemed to represent a significant revival, with a constitutional “By
the Court” decision in the first six months of her term and a subsequent annual
delivery approaching that of the Dickson Court. This would have been a story
with no clear trajectory, perhaps only highlighting the discretionary role of Chief
Justices, which would leave things very much open after 2018 when McLachlin
retires and a new Chief Justice chooses whether to step on the gas or the brakes.
I now back away from much of that description and will instead use the
preceding chronology to deliver rather a different message. And I will do so
by identifying three substantively different sets of “By the Court” decisions,
describing how their interplay over time generates rather a different conclusion.126
A. THE REACTIVE CONVERSATION SET

The most obvious subset of the “By the Court” lists outlined above is that of the
cases involving answers to reference questions from government. I describe it as
reactive for the obvious reason that the government has to make the decision to
ask the question in the first place; I call it a conversation because, as I will argue
at more length below, the “By the Court” device turns this into a conversation
between the government and the Supreme Court as unified institutions.
The reference process is an unusual aspect of Canadian practice that permits
the government to put hypothetical or anticipatory questions before the Court.
This makes them quite different from normal appeals, which arise out of specific
concrete circumstances, come with a context that has been judicially explored
by the lower courts, and have an established set of relevant facts that have been
tested through an adversarial process. Appeals are essentially retrospective,
arriving at general and abstract questions only as they emerge from these concrete
124. [1994] 2 SCR 715, 115 DLR (4th) 449 [Quebec Sales Tax].
125. Quebec Secession Reference, supra note 33.
126. Technically four, of course, if we include the “accidental” set described above for the Dickson
Court, where “By the Court” seems to have served as an administrative necessity for decisions
initially assigned in the normal way that could not be reported in the normal way. In Healy,
Chouinard had died in the interval; in Ford and Devine, LeDain had suffered a breakdown;
in Clark, three retirements had reduced the panel to its constitutional minimum. There is no
clear reason to think that this list could be expanded by any further examples.
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factual and legal circumstances. By contrast, reference questions make the Court
function in a way that makes it more like a legislature.127 It is asked to work in a
judicial-factual vacuum, answering hypothetical questions in general terms and
implicitly committing itself in advance to rules or principles that have not been
tested in concrete circumstances or sounded out in lower court proceedings.128
To consider references from the federal government first: The use of federal
references is subject to an easily visible ebb and flow, with periods of intense usage
alternating with intervals of complete absence. There were three in three years
in the 1950s, followed by none for a decade; only one in the dozen years before
2010 but then six in five years. In total, by my count there have been twenty-nine
federal references since the end of World War II.
Pushing the list back to 1946 highlights the dramatic change represented
by Truscott in 1967. In the twelve years after the end of World War II, there
were nine federal references. All were dealt with in the seriatim style: Every judge
on the panel wrote his own freestanding reasons without referring in any way
to any of the others or adopting any part of them. These separate reasons may
have covered very similar ground and reached very similar conclusions, but the
multiple independent versions needed to be parsed closely to find the real core
of an institutionally supported position. The abolition of appeals to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in 1949 had no effect on this style of delivery.
But Truscott is the great watershed—every single reference case before,
but not a single such case afterward, was dealt with seriatim. There have been
twenty reference cases since 1966; thirteen were unanimous, and fourteen were
resolved by joint judgments, anonymous in the sense that they lacked the normal
author-identifying attribution. The overlap of unanimous and anonymous
decisions goes someway to explaining why “By the Court” has generally been
taken as implying both unanimity and anonymity: Only one post-1967 reference
case was unanimous without being anonymous, and only two were anonymous
without being unanimous.
127. This is why, when Australia amended its Judiciary Act in 1910 to allow the federal
government to pose reference questions to its own High Court, that Court promptly
decided that the amendment itself was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of
the separation of powers. See Helen Irving, “Advisory Opinions, the Rule of Law and the
Separation of Powers” (2004) 4 Macquarie LJ 105.
128. The Court always formally insists that its decisions in federal reference cases (which it
self-describes as “opinions” rather than “judgments”) are purely advisory and tentative and
cannot serve as precedent in the same way as normal judgments; in practice, it cites its own
prior reference case decisions in just the same way as other decisions, and it has never simply
repudiated them in subsequent litigation.
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TABLE 5: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN FEDERAL REFERENCE
CASES, 1946-2015
Reference

Year

Number of
Judgement Anonymous
Judges on
Style
or Attributed?
Panel

Co-operative Committee on Japanese
Canadians v Canada (Attorney General)129

1946

7

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re s 6 of the Farm Security Act, 1944
of Saskatchewan130

1947

6

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Minimum Wage Act
(Saskatchewan)131

1948

6

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Validity of s 5(a) of Dairy Industry
Act (Canada)132

1949

7

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Wartime Leasehold Regulations133

1950

7

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Bowater’s Pulp & Paper Mills
Ltd134

1950

7

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Industrial Relations Disputes
Investigations Act (Canada)135

1955

9

Seriatim

Attributed

R v Coffin136

1956

7

Seriatim

Attributed

Reference re Farm Products Marketing Act
(Ontario)137

1957

8

Seriatim

Attributed

Truscott138

1967

9

Divided

Anonymous

139

Re Offshore Minerals

1967

7

Unanimous

Anonymous

Reference re Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1986-69 (Canada)140

1970

9

Divided

Attributed

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

[1946] SCR 248, 3 DLR 321.
[1947] SCR 394, [1947] 3 DLR 689.
[1948] SCR 248, [1948] 3 DLR 801.
[1949] SCR 1, [1949] 1 DLR 433.
[1950] SCR 124, [1950] 2 DLR 1.
[1950] SCR 608, [1950] 4 DLR 65.
[1955] SCR 529, [1955] 3 DLR 721.
Supra note 39.
[1957] SCR 198, 7 DLR (2d) 257.
Supra note 36.
Supra note 34.
[1970] SCR 777, 10 DLR (3d) 699.
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TABLE 5: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN FEDERAL REFERENCE
CASES, 1946-2015
Reference

Year

Number of
Judgement Anonymous
Judges on
Style
or Attributed?
Panel

Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 1975
(Canada)141

1976

9

Divided

Attributed

Re Upper House142

1980

8

Unanimous

Anonymous

Reference Re Newfoundland
Continental Shelf 143

1984

7

Unanimous

Anonymous

Manitoba Language Reference144

1985

7

Unanimous

Anonymous

Reference re Milgaard 145

1992

5

Unanimous

Anonymous

1992

5

Unanimous

Anonymous

1991

7

Divided

Attributed

1992

9

Unanimous

Anonymous

1994

7

Unanimous

Attributed

Quebec Secession Reference

1998

9

Unanimous

Anonymous

Same-Sex Reference151

2004

9

Unanimous

Anonymous

Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction
Act152

2010

9

Divided

Attributed

Securities Reference153

2011

9

Unanimous

Anonymous

2012

9

Unanimous

Anonymous

Reference re Milgaard

146
147

Reference re Ng Extradition

148

Language Rights Reference
149

Quebec Sales Tax

150

154

Reference re Broadcasting Act*

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

[1976] 2 SCR 373, 68 DLR (3d) 452.
Supra note 51.
Supra note 57.
Supra note 13.
Supra note 39.
[1992] 1 SCR 866, 90 DLR (4th) 1.
[1991] 2 SCR 858, 84 DLR (4th) 498.
Supra note 85.
Supra note 124.
Supra note 33.
Supra note 104.
2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 SCR 457.
Supra note 2.
2012 SCC 4, [2012] 1 SCR 142.
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TABLE 5: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN FEDERAL REFERENCE
CASES, 1946-2015
Reference

Year

Number of
Judgement Anonymous
Judges on
Style
or Attributed?
Panel

Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy
CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order
CRTC 2010-168*155

2012

9

Divided

Attributed

Nadon156

2014

7

Divided

Anonymous

Senate Reform Reference157

2014

8

Unanimous

Anonymous

* = federal references to Federal Court, appealed to SCC

The significance of “By the Court” in this situation is that it effectively
positions the Supreme Court as a unified institution providing the other half of
a conversation about national governance with the federal government. It is not
that the government was not bound by the actual outcome of previous reference
cases; and it is certainly not to deny that some had significant impact. The
point is rather that there was no clear unified statement from the Court as an
institution, no single firm collective declaration of the law and the reasons for it.
It is the clarity of this product in the directly policy-relevant moment of a federal
reference that makes “By the Court” a significant element in the emergence of the
Court as a major national institution. But one major implication of this powerful
opportunity for influence is that it is necessarily reactive: one can only answer a
question when and if one has been asked the question in the first place.158
To this point I have been discussing federal reference questions, but in
Canadian usage the provinces have also given themselves the parallel power
vis-à-vis their own provincial highest courts, with an option of appealing that
decision to the Supreme Court itself. It is also worth noting, however, that these
cases are not normally resolved through “By the Court” decisions. Despite an
early appearance to the contrary when the Laskin Court used “By the Court”
for provincial references as regularly and as often as federal references—the set
155.
156.
157.
158.

2012 SCC 68, [2012] 3 SCR 489.
Supra note 16.
Supra note 3.
The Court can of course expand the question beyond what the government appears to have
had in mind (as they arguably did in the Quebec Secession Reference, going beyond the “is
there a right to unilateral secession” question—to which the answer was no—to lay out some
of the ground rules for a non-unilateral secession); and by the same token they can refuse to
answer one or more of the questions, as they did in the Same-Sex Reference.
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includes the Patriation Reference, the Quebec Veto Reference, the Exported Natural
Gas Reference, and McEvoy159—only a single recent provincial reference (Firearms
Reference) has been dealt with this way.160 The contrast is remarkable considering
that the Supreme Court has dealt with as many provincial as federal references in
the last fifty years, that most of them have been unanimous, and that a number
of them have dealt with major constitutional issues.
As a first important finding, then, “By the Court” has been developed as the
Court’s preferred way of dealing with federal (but not provincial) reference cases,
provided unanimity can be achieved but, on occasion, even when it cannot.
B. THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL SET

The second set of “By the Court” judgments involves cases that deal with issues
that relate directly to the judiciary as an institution, sometimes focusing on
the Supreme Court itself and sometimes involving more general matters. The
suggested list is:
TABLE 6: ‘BY THE COURT’ DECISIONS: THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONAL SET
Case

Year

Words

Subject

1967

30,000

Other

1997

13,765

Judicial Independence

1999

9,108

First Nations

Wewaykum

2003

11,497

Recusal

Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)165

2005

19,749

Recusal

Provincial Judges166

2005

19,523

Judicial independence

167

2011

9,576

s 96 jurisdiction

2014

18,513

Amendments re: SCC

161

Truscott

162

Tobias

163

Marshall 2

164

Ahmad

Nadon168

159. Although the way that McEvoy is indexed obscures the fact, it originated as a reference by the
New Brunswick government to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.
160. Patriation Reference, supra note 26; Quebec Veto Reference, supra note 55; Exported Natural Gas
Reference, supra note 27; McEvoy, supra note 56; Firearms Reference, supra note 97.
161. Supra note 36.
162. Supra note 87.
163. Supra note 96.
164. Supra note 103.
165. 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100 [Mugesara].
166. Supra note 109.
167. Supra note 113.
168. Supra note 16.
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Two reference cases (Truscott and Nadon, the artistically neat book ends
of the set) are included again here as well as in the previous section; in a way,
they seem to volunteer for such double counting because they are two of only
a handful cases that use an impersonal attribution style despite a divided panel.
Truscott has been discussed above as an unusual challenge to the prestige of
the Supreme Court. Nadon was comparably embarrassing, dealing with a unique
challenge to the validity of an appointment to the Supreme Court as well as
obliquely raising unsettled questions about the constitutional amending formulae
as they relate to the Supreme Court itself. Wewaykum and Mugesara both involved
recusal issues on the Supreme Court. These issues are critically important to
the judiciary because they go to the question of impartiality. Marshall 2 was a
unique institutional response (an extended denial of an application to reconsider
Marshall 1169) to an unexpected and unwelcome public reaction to an earlier
decision that had been interpreted in a way that Marshall 2 said was too expansive.
Tobias and Provincial Judges are two cases in an extensive string of important (and
usually not unanimous) cases revolving around judicial independence issues.170
And although the apparent issue in Ahmad was the recurrent dilemma of the
balance between individual rights and national security, the main substance of
the decision dealt with the jurisdiction of the provincial superior (“Section 96”)
courts, and whether a legislative assignment of certain aspects of the case to the
Federal Court did or did not violate that jurisdiction.171
This is not to say that all cases involving judicial institutional questions,
or even all such unanimous cases, are dealt with through the anonymity of “By
the Court” judgments. Clearly the most important recent case dealing with
the judiciary was the 1997 Remuneration Reference,172 which could have been
rendered as a joint judgment even in the face of LaForest’s vigorous dissent—in
the style of Truscott and Nadon—but it was not. Although not as clear-cut as
the first, this set seems firmly enough established to justify identifying judicial
institutional matters as a second focus for “By the Court” decisions.
C. THE PROACTIVE SET

The third use of “By the Court” judgments is the proactive set: The Court
decides, on its own initiative and for its own reasons, that an issue arising in a
normal appeal (that is to say, not a reference case) deserves this unusual decision
169.
170.
171.
172.

Supra note 90.
See McCormick, supra note 119.
Ahmad, supra note 113 at paras 55-65.
Supra note 118.
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format. The label is proactive because the decision to elevate the matter to this
decision format is made without any clear external trigger (e.g., a federal reference
or a judicial institutional issue) to indicate clearly and ahead of time that a case is
likely to be decided “By the Court.” In one sense, this is simply a residual category,
the cases that are left when those that can be assigned to other categories have
been removed. But in another sense, this is the most intriguing and potentially
exciting use of “By the Court,” as it involves the most discretionary and inherently
open-ended deployment of this new judgment-presentation device. It presents a
standing opportunity to create, continue, reinforce, or expand a precedent in a
particularly emphatic way.173
TABLE 7: “BY THE COURT” DECISIONS: THE PROACTIVE SET
Chief Justice

Case

Year
174

Subject

Cartwright

Board of Transport Commissioners

1967

Federalism

Laskin

175

Blaikie 1/Forest

1979

Federalism / Language

Laskin

Blaikie 2176

1981

Federalism / Language

Dickson

Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v
Quebec (Attorney General 177

1984

Charter/Language

Dickson

Irwin Toy178

1989

Charter

Dickson

179

Tremblay

1989

Charter

Libman v Quebec180

1997

Charter

2001

Charter

2001

Charter

Lamer
McLachlin
McLachlin

181

Latimer

182

Burns

173. Or even, as Rainer Knopff intriguingly suggests, to repudiate an earlier decision and
visibly change direction on some specific aspect of the law. See Rainer Knopff, “Charter
Reconsiderations” (2012) 21 National Magazine, 38. Carter would be an obvious example.
174. Supra note 35.
175. Blaikie 1, supra note 7; Forest, supra note 7.
176. Supra note 52.
177. Supra note 68.
178. Supra note 28.
179. Supra note 13.
180. Supra note 88.
181. Supra note 98.
182. Supra note 99.
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TABLE 7: “BY THE COURT” DECISIONS: THE PROACTIVE SET
Chief Justice

Case

Year

Subject

McLachlin

Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration183

2002

Charter

McLachlin

Powley/Blais184

2003

First Nations

McLachlin

Solski/Gosselin/Okwuobi185

2005

Charter/Language

2008

Charter

2008

Corporate law

McLachlin
McLachlin
McLachlin
McLachlin
McLachlin

186

Canada (Justice) v Khadr
187

BCE

188

2010

Charter

189

2015

Charter

190

2015

Charter

Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr
Carter
Smith

What is most striking about the list is its tilt toward recent cases—well over
half of the cases listed (two thirds if we count the companion cases of Powley/Blais
and Solski/Gosselin/Okwuobi separately) are decisions of the McLachlin Court.
They span from the earliest (Latimer and Burns) to the most recent decisions
(Carter and Smith) of her Chief Justiceship. If this set can be said to have a focus,
the major element is the Charter while the secondary focus is on constitutional
language issues. This dual emphasis on the Charter and language offsets the fact
that the all but invariant focus of the reference cases has been federalism questions.
The mystery that we are left with is why some cases have been selected for
this unusual judgment-delivery format while others have not. At time of writing,
the McLachlin Court has handed down more than a hundred unanimous
constitutional law decisions that meet some minimal threshold for significance
(arbitrarily but not unreasonably: reserved judgments over 5,000 words in
length), of which fewer than one in six attracts this anonymous treatment.
A further question is whether the single recent foray beyond the constitutional
law field—namely the landmark decision in BCE—is a one-of-a-kind aberration
or an early sign of a possible expansion of the practice.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Supra note 100.
Powley, supra note 101; Blais, supra note 102.
Solski, supra note 105; Gosselin, supra note 106; Okwuobi, supra 107.
Supra note 110.
Supra note 1.
Supra note 112.
Supra note 4.
Supra note 117.

1079 (2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

V. TELLING THE STORY: REVISED VERSION
My initial story line for “By the Court” as described above must therefore be
revised in several important ways. First, as already detailed, the device was not
invented by Laskin himself or by the Laskin Court. The minor tradition was
part of Supreme Court practice almost since the Court’s earliest days, and the
transition to the modern grand tradition occurred before Laskin became Chief
Justice—indeed, before he had even joined the Court. The central figure in the
initial emergence of the modern practice is therefore not Laskin but Cartwright.
Second, it seems unlikely that Laskin himself played a major part in the
revival or continuation of the grand tradition. For one thing, he had earlier
spoken on the other side of the issue. The idea of a single judgment format,
attributed to no one or nominally to the senior member of the panel, had
emerged immediately after the end of appeals to the Judicial Committee in 1949;
the question was whether the new status of the Supreme Court called for a new
style of judgment-delivery. The most vociferous opponent of the idea when it was
debated by the Canadian Bar Association was Laskin, who was concerned, first,
that it would silence minority voices on the Court and, second, that it would
convey a misleading impression of simplified certainty on nuanced legal issues.191
Experience can change such preferences, but this volte face seems unusually total,
especially in the absence of any explicit recantation. For another, Laskin missed
out on the intra-panel deliberations in Blaikie 1, and was not even included in
the panel for the later-filed Forest, for health reasons—he was hospitalized in
Vancouver for most of the 1979 fall term and returned to Ottawa only early
in December and to full duties on the Court toward the end of the following
January.192 The revival of “By the Court” on the Laskin Court in 1979 seems
to have happened during the only half-term when Laskin was not a regular full
participant in the Court’s internal interactions.
Third, a good part of the Dickson Court’s apparent embrace of “By the
Court” seems to have been an administrative device to accommodate the unusual
pressures of poor health and rapid personnel turnover on the Supreme Court in
the late 1980s, as indicated above; several of them seem to have involved finding
the least misleading way of dealing with unusual problems when the initial
drafters of a set of reasons could not, for one reason or another, be attributed
191. See Girard, supra note 9 at 187.
192. Ibid at 448; repeated in Philip Girard, “A Tempest in a Transatlantic Teapot: A Legal
Historian’s Critical Analysis of Frederic Bastien’s La Battaile de Londres” (2014) 51:2
Osgoode Hall LJ 673.
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in the normal way. A couple of others—Dorval and Wigman—are curious
counter-examples to the otherwise powerful generalization that “By the Court” is
used for constitutional decisions. If Laskin’s use of “By the Court” was reluctant,
Dickson’s use of it was—first impressions to the contrary notwithstanding—
somewhat fitful and unfocused.
Fourth, the picture of the Lamer Court as something of a retreat in the use of
“By the Court” judgments is harder to support when I have just finished arguing
that the Dickson Court’s use of the device was considerably more constrained
and qualified that it might have appeared at first glance. Assessing Lamer’s use
of “By the Court” is challenging: on the one hand, six cases in ten years is not
a particularly impressive count; but on the other hand, one of those six was
the Quebec Secession Reference,193 the poster-child of a high-profile, high-stakes
constitutional decision. What tilts the balance toward my judgment of Lamer’s
use of the device as constrained is the only example in fifty years of a unanimous
opinion in a federal reference question (Quebec Sales Tax194) that was not handled
“By the Court,” a striking departure from what seemed to be the single most
generalizable rule in the use of “By the Court.”
Fifth, these considerations all combine to make McLachlin’s use of “By the
Court” judgments the most striking of the set. Her deployment of the device
has been more frequent, more consistently applied to major cases, and more
explicitly focused on constitutional issues of some significant profile; further,
it was recently extended for the first time to a landmark decision that is not related
to constitutional matters (BCE).195 A string of the McLachlin Court’s “By the
Court” judgments on federalism issues generated a degree of public confrontation
between Court and government that is unprecedented in recent Canadian history.
But what is even more striking is that the pro-active use of “By the Court”—that
is to say, the ones that cannot be explained as accidental, as responses to federal
references, or as dealing with judicial institutional matters—has stepped up so
dramatically. If we unfold the companion cases for separate counting, we can
say that the McLachlin Court accounts for fully two thirds of all of these cases.
If the Laskin Court revived the practice, the McLachlin Court seems on the way
to invigorating it and sending it down this proactive channel.

193. Supra note 33.
194. Supra note 124.
195. Supra note 1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
“By the Court” decisions have been a surprisingly under-explored dimension
of the Supreme Court’s performance, but fifty years on we can see that there
have been about fifty examples of rulings in what I call the grand tradition. This
style of anonymous judgment has generally been focused on constitutional issues
down three different tracks: first, reactively to federal but not provincial reference
cases; second, defensively on issues impacting directly on the judiciary; and third,
proactively on constitutional issues at the Court’s internal discretion. “By the
Court” is a uniquely Canadian development that dates back half a century and
has embraced five different Chief Justiceships from Cartwright to McLachlin.
The McLachlin Court has transformed this category of judgments to such
an extent that it is not too much to say that “By the Court” has finally come of
age. It has been used by the Supreme Court often and importantly enough to
establish a pattern of conscious and strategic deployment that is hard to discern
for the earlier Chief Justiceships. One is left to wonder why it has done so and
what is really going on in this important shift in how the Court handles some of
its major cases. There has not been the slightest hint of a focused answer in any
of the Court’s decisions, in any formal statements by the Court, or in the public
speeches that the justices often make these days. By way of speculation, it may be
that McLachlin is concerned that the normal judicial attribution style runs the
risk of excessively personalizing major decisions, especially when the Chief Justice
in recent decades has assumed responsibility for delivering a disproportionate
share of those decisions. Even more emphatically than the normative unanimous
judgment, “By the Court” depersonalizes and thereby institutionalizes the Court’s
most important doctrinal statements.
Paradoxically, however, this depersonalization is accompanied by a very
personalized element: What will happen when McLachlin herself reaches
retirement age in 2018? Will her replacement continue the expansion and
regularization of the practice, or allow it to fade (as it vanished under Fauteux
after the innovations of Cartwright)? The way the practice has continued or
even accelerated with something now approaching a complete change in the
membership of the Court suggests that continuation is rather more likely than
atrophy. The impression remains that “By the Court” has some institutional
momentum behind it even while it establishes a clearer focus in its deployment,
such that it may be becoming a significant and permanent element of how the
Court does its major business, and perhaps not just its constitutional business.
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In any event, McLachlin has done enough that we should now connect the
device in its fully developed form not with any of her predecessors but with her
own Court’s vigorous deployment of it. “By the Court” has now come of age as an
innovative and uniquely Canadian practice for particularly important decisions,
primarily but perhaps no longer exclusively with respect to constitutional law,
and in the process it has become a more reliable marker of a decision that deserves
particular notice. Cartwright was the initial innovator; Laskin presided over its
revival; but McLachlin has made it a significant feature of her term. Given that I
have identified 1967 as the year when the grand tradition emerged, we are now
mere months short of a fiftieth anniversary of the practice, which makes this an
appropriate time—and this commentary an appropriate way—to acknowledge it.

